This study aims to examine the effect on stock returns of 28 terrorist and military events occurring between 1963 and 2012. The authors divide the sample and examine these attacks on the basis of industry, country targeted, location, terrorism versus militarism and predicted overall impact. The authors measure the effects of the events in our sample along several dimensions: in the aggregate; comparatively across industries; by each event's predicted level of impact; by the type of event (terrorist versus military); by the location of the attack (USA or outside the USA); and by whether the USA was, directly or by proxy, the primary target of the attack. Findings: Stock returns are significantly lower for those industries predicted to be most hurt than for other industries. Events that the authors predict to be of high impact to the market are followed by significantly lower returns than events we predict to be of low impact. Stocks perform significantly worse on the days of terrorist events than on the days of military events, but the opposite is true for the day after. Significantly lower returns follow events that occur inside the USA or where the USA was the primary target.
Introduction
Several studies have examined the effect of terrorism on stock returns. In this paper, we attempt to add to and expand upon that literature by using a sample of both terrorist and military events, largely compiled from documents issued by the US Department of State,existing literature on this topic. Second, we examine each event on an industry level and compare the effects on industries that we predict to be most damaged by the event to other industries. Third, we compare events that we predict to be of high impact to events that we predict to be of low impact in the context of overall stock returns. Fourth, we distinguish between terrorism and militarism by classifying each event as one or the other and then comparing the two groups on the basis of its attendant stock returns. Finally, we study the effects of terrorism and militarism based on the location of the attack (within the USA versus outside the USA) and on the target of the attack (USA or non-USA).
We structure the rest of our paper as follows. Section 2 describes the sample construction and methods of the study. Section 3 provides some overall results of the effect of terrorism and militarism on the market. Section 4 examines the data in more detail by distinguishing between industries, the predicted levels of impact for the different events and the types of events. Section 5 focuses on the location of the attack and the location of the target. Section 6 describes the results of six multiple regressions involving the set of predictor variables developed in the previous sections. Section 7 concludes the study.
Data and methods
We originally selected several major terrorist incidents from the US Department of State's archive of "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961 Incidents, -2003 : A Brief Chronology" file, which outlines roughly 250 events occurring between 1961 and 2003. We intended to focus on some of the largest and most notorious events, and the online chronology (which can be available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm) was very helpful in doing so. We added a significant military event, the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War, by using a chronology of the war that was published by USA Today: http:// usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/index/iraq/nirq050.htm. We also consulted "Johnston's Archive" (www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html), which is sourced from US government releases, research papers from historic organizations and mainstream news archives and the FBI's "Major Terrorism Cases" file (www.fbi.gov/about-us/ investigate/terrorism/terrorism_cases), to round out our sample. From these lists of terrorist attacks and military incidents, we ended up selecting 28 events. We then predicted each event to have either a high, medium or low impact on the market, we designated each event as either "terrorism" or "military", each event location as domestic (USA) or foreign and each event by whether the USA was the primary country targeted. Table I presents all of the events in our sample along with their dates, times and various designations. Although our sample concentrates more heavily in the past two decades, almost half of the events occur between 1963 and 1993, with the rest occurring between 1995 and 2012. Overall, we predict four events to have high impact on the market (versus 11 having medium impact and 13 having low impact), we classify 23 of the events as terrorism and 5 as militarism, 6 of the events occurred in the USA while 22 occurred outside the USA, and the USA was the "target" country 12 times, while other countries were the primary target 16 times.
For each event, we calculate both the equally weighted and value-weighted returns for all stocks included in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database for the day of and day immediately following the event. The reader can consider these returns to be "normal", "market" or "unadjusted" returns. If the event occurred after 4:00 
Notes:
The table above lists the 28 events in our sample, along with the date and eastern standard time of each event; also included are the predicted market impact of each event (high, medium or low) and the designation of each event as either a terrorist attack or military attack, domestic attack or foreign attack and the USA; target or other target attack; all of the "Domestic" attacks in our sample are attacks in which the USA was the primary target, but not all "Foreign" attacks had foreign targets; for example, the most recent event in our sample, the US Embassy attack in Libya, occurred on foreign soil but clearly targeted the USA p.m. Eastern Time, we use the following two trading days instead. We examine these returns both in isolation and in comparison with market returns occurring on non-event days. We also predict which industries will be most adversely affected by each event and then divide the sample along two-digit and four-digit SIC codes on that basis to compare the event-period returns to the two industry groups. We provide more details on our industry-level analysis in Section 4 of this study.
Aggregate effects of terrorism and militarism
We begin by examining the overall effects of our sample of terrorist and military events on the stock market. Notes: The table above provides mean returns to individual stocks and to value-and equally-weighted portfolios of stocks on the trading day of and immediately following the 28 terrorist or military attacks in our sample; the left portion of panel A shows the mean return to all of the stocks in the CRSP database on those days; the center and right portions provide the value-and equally-weighted returns, respectively; Panel B compares the mean value-and equally-weighted market returns on the day of the event to the mean returns on other days. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level Panel B of Table II compares the equally-and value-weighted market portfolio returns on the days of terrorist and military events to other days. As expected, the returns on other days are slightly positive, reflecting the small daily expected return to investing in the stock market. On event days, the average return is roughly 0.3 per cent lower than for non-event days (one can consider this an abnormal market return of Ϫ0.3 per cent when benchmarked against days that are not affected by terrorist or military events). Again, however, the relatively small number of events in our sample renders the difference statistically insignificant. Table III shows the mean return across all companies in the CRSP database for each of the 28 events in our sample. The results vary considerably, with a significantly negative market return occurring on the day of 12 of those events, but with significant positive returns occurring on the day of many other events. The most extreme of these events, from the perspective of the mean same-day stock return, was the September 11, . In summary, the results for individual events and for the overall market are quite mixed. In the next section of this study, we focus on these 28 events at the levels of industry, predicted impact and type of event (terrorist versus military).
Analysis by industry, predicted impact and type of event 4.1 Predicted industry impact
For each event, we predicted which industries we thought would be most negatively affected. In general, we predicted the finance and banking, insurance and travel and tourism industries to be the most adversely affected by the events in our sample, but the specific industries predicted to be hurt naturally varied by event. For example, we predicted the September 11 terrorist attacks to have a wider-ranging impact across industries than the TWA hijacking in the June of 1985, which we expected to primarily affect travel and tourism. Appendix provides the list of industries that we predicted to be the most negatively influenced by each event. Table IV provides the day-of, day-after and day-of-and-after returns for two groups of firms. The first group consists of those companies for which the dichotomous variable BadInd equals 1. These firms operate in at least one industry predicted to be the most negatively affected by the event of that day, and represent about 22 per cent of our overall sample. The results in Table IV bear out our predictions. On the day of the event, Notes: Panel A below compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean return for those companies that we predict to be more negatively affected by the events in our sample, based on the industries in which they operate, to the mean return of those that we predict to be less negatively affected; Panel B makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign of the returns for the two groups, where we assign a value of ϩ1 to a positive stock return, zero to a return of zero and Ϫ1 to a negative return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *denotes significance at the 10% level shares of stock from the industries that we predicted to be the most negatively affected performed significantly worse than the stocks of other industries. Moreover, while stocks from other industries experienced a more-than-full rebound the following day, stocks for which BadInd ϭ 1 experienced only a half recovery from the losses of the day before. Panel B reports the mean sign of the return (ϩ1 for a positive return, zero for a return of zero and Ϫ1 for a negative return); the results are the same for the day of the event, but the signs reverse for the day after the event. In sum, we can say for certain that on the day of the event, the firms that were most damaged by the event were those that we predicted would be.
Predicted event impact
It is also likely that different events will have effects of different magnitudes on stock returns overall. We predict each event to be of high, medium or low impact and then compare the returns for all companies across those three categories of events. While these predictions are necessarily subjective and therefore debatable, we attempt to categorize each event on the basis of both the amount (and intensity) of the media generated and the likely economic implications of the event. By doing this, we hope to capture in our predictions both the expected material economic effects on stock returns as well as the psychological (including behavioral) effects. The events that we predicted to be of high impact on the stock market were the start of the first gulf war (January 1991), the bombing of the World Trade Center (February 1993), the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the start of the war in Afghanistan (October 2001). We predicted all of the other events in the sample to be of either medium or low impact [1] . Table V presents results that are again consistent with our initial hypothesis. Events of predicted high and medium impact resulted in significantly negative stock returns, with predicted high-impact events turning out to be the most damaging with a mean stock return of Ϫ0.45 per cent. Stock returns on the days of events predicted to be of low impact were not significantly different from zero. In addition, stock returns for predicted high-impact events were again significantly negative on the day following the event, resulting in a two-day loss of Ϫ0.83 per cent. When we examine only the sign of each company's return and ignore its magnitude (Panel B), there is no significant difference on the day zero between the predicted high-impact and predicted low-impact events. It is perhaps not surprising that it is in the magnitude of the returns where the difference between predicted high-and low-impact terrorist acts lies. In any event, the mean two-day return sign is significantly lower for predicted high-impact events than for predicted low-impact events, similar to the results in Panel A, which include the magnitude of the returns.
Type of event
The events in our sample differ also by whether they are terrorist attacks or military events. There are five military events in our sample:
(1) the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (August 1990); (2) the start of the first war in Iraq (January 1991); We classify each of the other 23 events in the sample as a terrorist attack. Table VI yields some interesting results. While stock returns are significantly negative on the days of terrorist attacks and significantly positive on the days of military events, the reverse is true for the trading day that immediately follows. The mean two-day stock performance, it turns out, is actually lower (more negative) for military events than it is for terrorist attacks. We obtain similar results when we focus only on the sign and ignore the magnitude of the returns, with the exception that there is no significant difference between the mean stock return signs on the day of the event for the two categories of events. In any case, it is interesting to note the opposite reversals for the two types of events, and we leave it to the reader to speculate on any possible reasons for them.
Geographical analysis: the location and target of the attack

The location of the attack
We next divide our sample on the basis of whether the attack occurred inside the USA. Panel A compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean return across all stocks for those events that we predict to be of relative high, medium and low aggregate impact; The bottom row shows the difference between the aggregate returns of predicted high-and of predicted low-impact events; Panel B makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign of the returns for the two groups, where we assign a value of ϩ1 to a positive stock return, zero to a return of zero and Ϫ1 to a negative return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *denotes significance at the 10% level Table VII presents a comparison of stock returns on and immediately after the six domestic events to those on and immediately following the 22 foreign events. The difference on the day of the attack is highly significant, with attacks inside the USA generating a mean return of Ϫ0.833 per cent versus only Ϫ0.051 per cent for foreign attacks. Interestingly, the returns on the day after the event are not significantly different between the two groups; while domestic attacks are followed by a recovery of about 1/3 the size of the initial loss, foreign attacks are followed by a much greater gain than the initial loss. Panel B, in which we report the results only for the sign of the return and not the magnitude, tells a similar story. Overall, it appears that the universe of CRSP stocks is much more negatively affected by attacks that occur within the USA than by attacks occurring elsewhere.
The target of the attack
The last round of analysis that we perform involves dividing the data by whether the principal target of the attack was the USA. We designate the USA to be the principal target of 12 of the 28 attacks in our sample. For us to designate the USA as the target, the attack can come from within (e.g. the Oklahoma City bombing) or from without (e.g. the September 11 attacks) and the attack need not take place on USA soil (e.g. the 1983 and 2012 attacks on the US embassies in Beirut and Libya, respectively, or the kidnapping of journalist Daniel Pearl). Overall, events primarily targeting the USA comprise about 43 per cent of the stock-days in our sample. Table VIII provides the results of this analysis. On the day of the attack, stocks included in the CRSP database fell by an average of 0.355 per cent if the attack principally targeted the USA and only 0.084 per cent if not. However, stock returns on Panel A compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean return across all stocks for terrorist attacks and military attacks; the bottom row shows the difference between the aggregate returns of terrorist attacks and military attacks; Panel B makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign of the returns for the two groups, where we assign a value of ϩ1 to a positive stock return, zero to a return of zero and Ϫ1 to a negative return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *denotes significance at the 10% level the day after attacks on the USA were higher than for other attacks, representing an almost complete rebound in the case of the former. Still and all, the two-day returns were lower around attacks on the USA than attacks on other countries. Panel B, however, shows a difference in the mean sign of these returns, suggesting again that the magnitude of individual stock returns is an important factor in the overall results.
Regression analysis
We estimate six regressions in an effort to determine the effects of all of the aforementioned variables on event-period stock returns. In these regressions, we use different combinations of five dummy variables: (1) BadInd, which equals one if the company operates in an industry or industries that we had predicted to be the most adversely affected by the attack and zero otherwise. (2) High Impact, which equals one if we had predicted the attack to be of relatively high market impact and zero if we had predicted the attack to be of medium or low impact. (3) Terrorism, which equals one if we classified the attack as an act of terrorism and zero if we classified it as a military attack. (4) USA (Location), which equals one if the attack occurred inside the USA and zero otherwise. (5) USA (Target), which equals one if the USA was the primary target of the attack and zero otherwise. Notes: Panel A below compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean returns across all stocks for events that occur inside the USA to the returns of all stocks for events occurring outside the USA; the bottom row shows the difference between the aggregate returns for the two groups of events; Panel B makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign of the returns for the two groups of events, where we assign a value of ϩ1 to a positive stock return, zero to a return of zero and Ϫ1 to a negative return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *denotes significance at the 10% level
For each of the three return windows that we examine (Day 0, Day 1 and Day 0 and Day 1 combined), we estimate two regressions. The first regression uses BadInd, High Impact, Terrorism and USA (Location) as the predictor variables. The second also uses BadInd, High Impact and Terrorism but replaces USA (Location) with USA (Target), given that these are the two most highly correlated of the indicator variables and, in fact, the cases in which USA (Location) equals one are a subset of the cases in which USA (Target) equals one. For all of these regressions, we convert the response variable into percentage terms, meaning that a value of 1.0 is equal to 1 per cent. Therefore, the reader should interpret the coefficients in Table IX on the independent variables to be their relative contributions in percentage points toward the total return for that period. In all six regressions, the coefficient on BadInd is negative, indicating that those firms operating in "bad" industries experience lower returns on both the day of and the day after the attack. The coefficients for Day 1 are of marginal (two-tailed) significance, however. The BadInd coefficient of Ϫ0.081 in the first regression suggests that operating in an industry that we had predicted to be the most adversely affected by the attack contributes about Ϫ0.08 per cent, in addition to the effects of the other variables, toward the overall day-zero return for the average company. The coefficients on High Impact, Terrorism, USA (Location) and USA (Target) are generally of greater magnitude and significance than the coefficient on BadInd. Similar to our previous results, we find that the events that we had predicted to be of high impact are accompanied by lower returns, as are attacks located inside the USA. Attacks for which the USA was the principal target may have lower returns; the coefficients are negative Panel A compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean returns across all stocks for events that primarily target the USA to the returns of all stocks for events that primarily target other countries; the bottom row shows the difference between the aggregate returns for the two groups of events; Panel B makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign of the returns for the two groups of events, where we assign a value of ϩ1 to a positive stock return, zero to a return of zero and Ϫ1 to a negative return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *denotes significance at the 10% level Notes: This table shows the results of six regressions on event-period stock returns; the response variable is stock returns occurring on the day of the attack for the first two regressions (listed on the left), the day immediately following the attack for the middle two regressions and the two days combined for the two regressions listed on the right; the independent variables are all dichotomous: BadInd ϭ 0 if the company operates in an industry that we predict to be hit hardest by the attack, high impact ϭ1 if we predict the event itself to be of high market impact, terrorism ϭ 1 if we classify the event as a terrorist attack rather than a military attack, USA (Location) ϭ 1 if the attack occurred in the USA and USA (Target) ϭ 1 if the USA was the principal target of the attack; t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients for each independent variable; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and * denotes significance at the 10% level but range from insignificant to highly significant. Terrorist attacks have significantly lower returns than military attacks on Day 0, but significantly higher returns on Day 1. These results suggest that the variables we predict to influence returns around terrorist and military attacks do in fact help explain those returns, and in a manner, that is generally consistent with the direction of our predictions.
Conclusions
While there are many studies that examine the effects of terrorism on the stock market, most of those studies focus on one or two specific events or stock market locations (for additional examples, see Nguyen and Enomoto, 2009; Hon et al., 2004) . The studies in this area also tend to concentrate on very specific characteristics of the attack(s) that they examine, such as the size of the market affected or on the aggregate effect to that market. The most comprehensive article to date (Karolyi and Martell (2006) ) examines attacks that occurred between 1995 and 2002 and thus omits many significant events that occurred outside that window. Our study focuses on 28 high-profile events over a 50-year period and makes several new contributions to the literature. First, we find compelling cross-sectional differences between stock returns at the industry level, depending on the nature of the event. Second, we find that there are significant differences in mean returns between events and that these differences can be predicted ex-ante, with predicted high-impact events resulting in one-and two-day returns that are both significantly negative and significantly below those of the other events. Third, we distinguish between terrorist and military attacks and compare the event-period returns on that basis. Fourth, we separate our sample on the basis of geography, first by the location of the attack and then by the country primarily targeted (in both cases, we compare attacks inside or targeting the USA to those inside or targeting other countries). We find that, once again, the results are in keeping with our original predictions. Finally, we estimate six regressions on stock returns for the day of and day following the events in our sample, and find results that are consistent with our earlier analysis and conclusions.
We believe that this study can help researchers and investors to more deeply understand the overall market and industry effects of significant terrorist and military events. By offering a thorough examination of the differences between high-profile attacks in the context of stock returns both on the day of and the day immediately following those attacks, we hope that people will be able to better grasp the likelihood and magnitude of the initial damage done by these attacks as well as the subsequent recovery.
